2005 Study is Fatally Flawed
After months of insistence that the study of the
2005 aerial ULV spraying of Sacramento was going to be published in
a
peer-reviewed journal, we received word that a report had been posted on the
CDC
website as of May 2008. A list of reviewers for that
outlet,
however,
includes the names of
vector-control officials. This is clearly not a scientific
journal, as had
been implied. A careful
review of the paper reveals why it was not published in a
scientific journal, as it is fatally flawed in a number of ways.
We considered this study to be critical, because
the
District had previously offered the Nasci
Fort
Collins study and a
"Louisiana paper" as evidence of efficacy. Neither of
these
supplied evidence, however.
This left the 2005 Sacramento study as the sole bit of "evidence" on
which the District relies to justify its aerial ULV spraying of
populated areas. However, the study is fatally flawed.
See
a more complete discussion of the complete lack of scientific
evidence to support the aerial ULV spray over populated areas here.
An
unsupported
assumption about where the human
infections originated renders the human-infection data meaningless,
and
a failure to take the heavy wind into account renders the mosquito
count data meaningless. Therefore, no
conclusions whatsoever about efficacy of aerial ULV
spray can be drawn from the paper.
There is no need
to
point out
the significant flaws in the
analysis, as the fatally flawed data renders them moot. The
heavy
winds were not
mentioned
in the
paper. One PhD molecular biologist who reviewed the paper
and our critique said that "I agreed with the points you made and am
likewise appalled at their use and interpretation of the
data."
Only a quick read of the Carney article and our
critique
shows, however, that no credentials are needed to see the fatal
flaws
in this study
-- all one needs is a little intelligence and an inquiring
mind.
We had previously
commented on various charts and tables that had been released
by
CDPH.
We had also previously tried to get a copy of the
draft
of the paper, since the CDPH was citing it in different parts of the
state as efficacy of adulticiding. Several Public Record Act
(PRA)
requests, however, failed to turn up the raw data upon which the
analysis is based, and no referee's reports were produced. We
are
left to wonder if the data were incomplete and if the report
actually
was reviewed by any reviewers, independent ones or
otherwise. The authors
thank a number of people for "thorough review of this manuscript,"
no sign of any such reviews was ever produced in response to the PRA
requests, and we can only conclude that if any reviews happened they
were at best word of mouth. A
detailed account of our efforts to procure the raw data and the
supporting documents follows.
CDPH
Refuses
to Divulge Purported Evidence.
As we noted above, in absence of any
scientific evidence
whatsoever as to the efficacy of adulticide spraying, vector control
and public health officials have made claims around the state (on
the radio, before city councils, to concerned citizens, etc.) that
their "study" of
the 2005 spraying of Sacramento proves that spraying "works," and
they
said this was all explained in a paper they were submitting for
publication. We began long ago to try to uncover this
"evidence." We outline some of our efforts below. If
this
study really had provided good evidence of efficacy, one would think
that the CDPH would have been eager to get it into the hands of
skeptics.
After a number of past discussions with them
about
the details of their "study," our entomologist had critiqued it for us. The
information
he was able to obtain suggests that this "study" is a scientific
embarrassment, perhaps coming mainly because impertinent
citizens began to ask them for evidence that spraying adulticides
"works"
(slows the transmission of West Nile virus to humans).
On July 27, 2007, in a meeting with Sacramento
City
Councilmember Rob Fong, Vicki Kramer, Chief of the Vector-Borne
Disease
Section of the California Department of Public Health, held a paper
in
her hand
she
claimed contained the evidence gleaned from the 2005 Sacramento
spraying. She held it up as proof that adulticiding works and
indicated that they were getting ready to submit it to a
peer-reviewed
journal. She noted to us that they had repaired certain
problems
in what they had previously released. She did not provide us
with
a copy of the paper and showed parts of it selectively.
On August 1, 2007, we made an email request of
Vicki
Kramer for a copy of the paper. We never received the
courtesy of any reply whatsoever to this note. On August 8,
2007,
we thus filed a Public Records Act
request
for copies of any risk/benefit analyses on which they had relied and
for a copy of the paper in order finally to get a complete look at
what
they considered
evidence. In an email response
on
August 20, their attorney supplied several items in response to our
queries about risk/benefit analyses (a copy of the 2007
California plan, a copy of a 2006 paper about ground
spray we have already critiqued,
a copy of a 2005 paper primarily about ground
spray in several southern states, and a copy of a 2004 paper
about ground
spray in New
York City) but denied our request for a copy of their
paper about the 2005 spraying of Sacramento "on the ground that the public
interest in withholding this draft from public scrutiny prior to
its
publication outweighs the public's interest in disclosure of the
draft."
It was hard for us to see how it is in the public interest that we
be
kept in the dark
about the
evidence that proves it is good for us to be sprayed with
poison.
The paper about the
spray in the southern states did include a test of aerial
application,
but it was of malathion (Naled), which is not used here. Once
again, we must
note that ground spray is a completely
different method than aerial spray, which means that vector control and public
health
officials had no
appropriate risk assessments before they sprayed these urban areas
aerially.
On August 31, we
explained that if they had wanted to
keep their "evidence" secret they could perhaps have chosen to do
so,
but that
once they chose to advertise it as justification of their spray
campaign the law does
not provide for selective disclosure. In a second email response,
on September 4, they produced some numbers and one chart
they said was in the paper, but this at best
continued to be selective disclosure.
In a subsequent email
note of September 11, Senior Staff Counsel Barrow indicated
that he
was reviewing our assertions and authorities. We responded on September 12 that the
law
leaves them
no discretion in the matter and that we would hold off until the
following
week to file a Petition for Writ of Mandate, in anticipation of
receiving the
paper in the meantime. We also made an additional Public Records Act request of any
and
all documents that were used in the preparation of or are cited in
the
report/paper. Barrow responded
on September 18 that the California Department of Public Health was
still reviewing our request.
We then asked by what date they would make their
decision,
Barrow responded only that the matter was under active review, and
on
September 25 we indicated that if the requested documents were not
provided by noon on September 28, we "will file a Petition for Writ
of
Mandate requesting the Court to direct the Department to turn over
the
requested documents and to award petitioners their attorney's fees
and
costs." These last three
emails are posted here, in
reverse
order.
What were they hiding? Why would they keep
evidence secret? Of course solid scientific evidence would
not be kept secret, and certainly none of us would
want our names associated with anything like this.
At 10:20 on the morning of September 28, they
faxed
us a copy of a draft of a paper entitled "Efficacy
of aerial mosquito adulticiding in reducing human cases of West Nile
virus in Sacramento County, 2005." [We have removed this draft
from the web page since the final version of the report has been
posted. It is available upon email request.] However,
their
attorney
also faxed us a letter that claimed
that
"CDPH has no such documents responsive to the request set forth in
your
PRA request, dated September 12, 2007." This is a most
remarkable
statement, as it would seem to imply that the draft was either
written in the absence of any data or all data and other materials
were
destroyed after the draft was written. Why would CDPH not want
people to see the data upon which the paper is based? A
quick note back indicated
that
"DPH's
refusal to acknowledge the existence of the requested documents is
the
most egregious violation of the Public Records Act that I have ever
encountered," and stated that "As it appears that DPH will only
comply with its obligations under the threat of litigation, if the
requested documents are not made available by 12:00 noon on October
8,
2007, my clients will be left with no choice but to file a Petition
for
Writ of Mandate in Sacramento Superior Court."
At 2:00 in the afternoon of October 10, we
received
a fax from Senior Staff Counsel Barrow that 175 pages
of documents relevant to our request of September 12 had indeed
turned
up after all. He indicated that our request had previously
seemed to be more limited in focus. Apparently our
September 28 threat of litigation served to clarify the focus for
Senior Staff Counsel Barrow. He also
indicated that some other relevant documents may be in the hands of
Ryan Carney, "who is not a CDPH employee." However, Carney is
listed on the draft report as an
Associate Public Health Biologist for the California Department of
Health Services, Vector-Borne Disease Section. Were documents
being hidden with Carney? We have never seen a joint work in
which all authors did not have essentially all information. If
these documents are being hidden with Carney, we can only ask
why.
Postscript:
In spite of yet more attempts to get it, the
missing
raw data was never supplied, but as we noted, the final version
of the report was finally posted on the CDC website, as of May
2008. Again, no
referee's reports were ever supplied. No reports of any kind
by
any reviewers were ever supplied, even though in the final paper the
authors thank eight people "for thorough review of this
manuscript." A full critique was not possible without full
information,
including the distribution of case
reports with case id; onset date and region for the 152 cases
detailed
in the main table; the mosquito mortality data from SYMVCD,
including
"sentinel" caged mosquitoes and the weekly population samples for
mosquito abundance and infection rates in the mosquitoes; the bird
infection rates from sentinel chickens; field population samples;
and
detailed maps of the indicated zones. Once again, however, the
analysis is
moot, as significant errors in the paper mean that it is fatally
flawed
and no
conclusions whatsoever can be drawn about the efficacy of aerial ULV
spraying. The unsupported assumption about where
the human infections originated renders the human-infection data
meaningless, and a failure to take the heavy wind into account
renders
the mosquito count data meaningless.